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Crouch: Actions Under the Death Statute and Survival of Actions for Perso

NOTES
ACTIONS UNDER THE DEATH STATUTE
AND SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
I. THE ACTIONS INVOLVED
The bases of survival actions and wrongful death actions require careful distinction. Survival adds, or rather substitutes, a party by continuing a cause of action already existing, but terminated by the death of
either the injured party or the tort-feasor in the absence of survival provisions; wrongful death gives rise to a separate and distinct cause of
action. The former rests upon the cause of action originally accruing to
the injured party, and logically should be limited to the redress that would
have been available to him had he lived or had the tort-feasor lived;
the latter ignores the rights of the deceased and regards solely the loss
occasioned by his death to the class of statutory beneficiaries entitled to
bring action. The concept of survival is further bisected into the rights of
the injured party as contrasted with the liabilities of the tort-feasor; the
cause of action is identical in either case, but the problem remains as to
whether it survives either to the successor to the right of the injured
party or against the successor to the liability of the tort-feasor, or in
both instances. These distinctions are preserved throughout the discussion
that follows, and a clear conception of them is essential to any successful
analysis of this branch of the law.
II.

THE COMMON-LAW RULE

At common law there is available no redress for personal injuries following the death of either the injured party or the tort-feasor.' Although
this rule has been criticized, 2 it is usually followed in the absence of

1

CRANDALL, FLORIDA ComroN LAW PRACTICE §10 (1928); Waller v. First Savings
& Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931); Moor v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151
P.2d 765 (1944); Hyatt v. Adams, 3 Mich. 180 (1867); In re Grainger's Estate, 121

Neb. 338, 237 N. W. 153 (1931); Musso v. Miller, 269 App. Div. 5, 54 N. Y. S.2d
(1945).
2
PRossEa, HANDBoox OP THY LAW oF TORTS §103 (1941) states, "The origin of
the rule that personal tort actions die with the plaintiff is rather obscure-the more
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statute. 3 The first statute to change the common law in this respect was
Lord Campbell's Act,4 passed in England in 1864, vihich created in the
beneficial heir a cause of action for the wrongful death of the injured
party but failed to provide for any survival. Indeed, there was no provision for survival until I934.5 All American states have passed statutes
similar to Lord Campbell's Act, 6 and most states have also passed survival
statutes, 7 which usually permit the representative to maintain an action
for personal injuries sustained by the deceased but normally omit provision for survival against the representative of the tort-feasor.
IM.

FLORIDA LAW, PAST AND PRESENT

0

Florida has both a Survival Statutes and a Death by Wrongful Act
Statute, 9 but the former was rendered nugatory at the outset. The Florida
so as contracts which were equally 'personal' were held to survive the death of
either"; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867), in which the court said, "The rule
rests more on an artificial distinction than real principle, and savors more of the
logic of the schoolmen than of common sense"; Harris v. Nashville Trust Co, 128
Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1914), where the court said that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona was by no means a favorite with the courts, and that
no judge or law writer had risen to defend it for two hundred years past. For the
origin and history of the rule see 32 L. Q. Ray. 431 (1916).
'De La Torre v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 754, 254 Pac. 1105 (1927); Indianapolis v.
Willis, 208 Ind. 607, 194 N. E. 343 (1935).
'19
& 10 Vic., c. 93 (1846).
LAw RItooR (Mxsczm~zous PRovisioNs) Acr, 1934, 24 & 25 Gzo. V, c. 41.

&'PossaR, oP. dt. supra note 2, §103.
'Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims for ard

against Executors and Administrators, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 969 (1930). Some courts
treat such statutes as being in derogation of the common law and, therefore, construe
them strictly: McNeely v. Natche, 148 Miss. 268, 114 So. 484 (1927); Strottmau v.
St. Louis L M. & S. Ry., 211 Mo. 227, 109 S. W. 769 (1908); Lubrano v. Atlantic
Mills, 19 R. I. 129, 32 At. 205 (1895). But other courts consider the statutes as
remedial in nature and say they should be liberally construed: Barnes Coal Co. v.
Retail Coal Merchants' Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645 (1942); Blakely v. Shortal's Estate, 336
Iowa 787, 20 N. W.2d/28 (1945) ; Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N. W. 377
(1934); Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S. C. 256, 15 S. E.2d 117
(1941).
'FIA. STAT. 1941, §45.11, "Abatement by death or change of parties: Personal Injuries. All actions for personal injuries shall die with the person, to wit: assault and
battery, slander, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; all other actions shall
and may be maintained in the name of the representatives of the deceased."
'FYA. STAT. 1941, §768.01.
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Supreme Court early held that the action did not survive, but died with
the injured party.O The enumeration in the Survival Statute of four
personal actions, namely, assault and battery, slander, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, was construed as a mere list of descriptive examples, and the statute was accordingly interpreted as effecting no
change in the common law rule. This interpretation was certainly justified
by the language of the statute; the surprising factor is that the court
was able to find any meaning at all in this careless draftmanship.
A similar interpretation appeared in Close v. Cunninghama in which
the plaintiff brought an action for injuries sustained because of defendant's negligent operation of a truck. During the action defendant died.
The court held that under the Survival Statute thfe cause of action
terminated upon the death of the defendant and did not survive against
his personal representative. Justice Terrell in a strong dissent argued
that the legislature intended only the four actions enumerated in the
statute to die with the person, and that the very purpose of the statute
was to enlarge the common-law rule so as to permit survival of the nonenumerated actions.
Under the construction of the Cunningham case the court was bound
sooner or later to encounter situations in which the application of the
rule would result in grave injustice. Such a case arose in Waler v. First
Savings and Trust Co. 12 The deceased, by having intentionally exploded
a bomb near a house, injured the plaintiff's wife to such an extent that her
leg had to be amputated,' 8 but unfortunately he died before institution
of suit. Survival of the action against the estate of the tort-feasor was
allowed on the ground that the English common-law rule in this instance
did not apply in Florida.1 4 The reasoning of the court was hampered
"Jacksonville

St. Ry. v. Chappell, 22 Fla. 616, 1 So. 10 (1886); Jones v.

Townsend, 23 Fla. 355, 2 So. 612 (1887), holding that the right of action for libel dies
with the plaintiff and that the action cannot be maintained in favor of his personal
representative. However, if a defendant libels the plaintiff in his will, actions
against the estate have been allowed in other jurisdictions. Hendricks v. Citizens' &
Sou. Natl. Bank, 43 Ga. App. 408, 158 S. E. 915 (1931); Harris v. Nashville Trust
Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1914). These are not properly cases of survival,
since the libel does not take place until after the decedent's death.
99 Fla. 1099, 128 So. 429 (1930).
12103

2

Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931).

" There was no doubt that the plaintiff could recover for the injury to the
property.
"The court stated that the English rule was changed in Florida, by the intend-
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by the erroneous assumption' 5 in the majority opinion that under the
English rule tort actions were based on vengeance' 6 and consequently
should no more survive the death of the tort.feasor than would a criminal
prosecution. The opinion reached the correct decision, however, by disregarding this difficulty, historically non-existent, and holding that the
old common-law rule did not apply in jurisdictions such as Florida, where
tort actions are primarily compensatory. In a later case an action brought
under the Death by Wrongful Act Statute against a tort-feasor was allowed to survive his death.' 7 The Wa/ler case, which dealt with the

Survival Statute, virtually overruled the Cunningham case by permitting
survival after the death of the tort-feasor. In a sweeping shift of position, the court further made it clear in a dictum that the dissent in the
Cunningham case-that only the four enumerated actions die with the
injured person-was thereafter to be the law.
Under the Survival Statute today it is, accordingly, immaterial that
ment of our Declaration of Rights (Sec. 4), which recognizes not only the punitive
nature of a tortious wrong done, but also recognizes and preserves in organic
language a legal remedy for that wrong, and which provides that the courts shall
always be open to afford it. The State of Nebraska puts a similar construction on its
statute, In re Estate of Granger, 121 Neb. 338, 237 N. W. 153 (1931). That the
decision could have been reached on another ground is brought out in 8 U. or PA.
L. REv. 1018 (1932),

which states, "That a desirable result was achieved in the

narrow interpretation of the statute is evident when we recognize the growing doctrine that a tort action is essentially compensatory rather than punitive. However, it
would appear that the court would have reached the same conclusions through admitting that the statute intended to abate all actions for personal injuries, by subscribing to the proposition that the husband's action for loss of marital services is
not an action for 'injuries to the person,' within the meaning of the statute, an interpretation accorded similar statutes by other courts." In some jurisdictions having survival statutes, no recovery is allowed against the personal representatives of a deceased
tort-feasor. Burford v. Evans, 191 Okla. 555, 132 P.2d 653 (1942); Claussen v.
Brothers, 148 S. C. 1, 145 S. E. 539 (1938).
158 HowswoRT, HisoRy or Eimias LAw 447-48 (2d ed. 1937).
"WaIler v. First Savings and Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 1037, 138 So. 780, 786
(1931).
1T
nternational Shoe Co. v. Hewitt, 123 Fla. 587, 167 So. 7 (1936). In this case
the tort-feasor was killed in the same accident. In uther jurisdictions, unless the
statute provides for survival against the tort-feasor, the common law rule still prevails and the action dies with the tort-feasor. Wright v. Smith, 136 Kan. 205, 14
P.2d 640 (1932); Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. 94, 17 Ad. 228 (1889); Carrigan v. Cole,
35 R. I.-162, 85 At. 934 (1913); Layton v. Rowland, 197 Wis. 535, 222 N. W. 811
(1929); Tuttle .v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 Pac. 524 (1930).
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the death of a tort-feasor precedes the institution of suit.' 8 It is likewise immaterial that the plaintiff dies before trial. For example, in
State v. Parks,1" the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident
through the negligence of the defendant. Issue was joined, but the
plaintiff died before trial. The court stated that the action could be
maintained in the name of his administrator, and followed in its decision the
dictum in the Waller case that only the four enumerated actions die with the
injured person. 2o In another case, 2 ' however, in which the injured person died before suit was instituted, the court denied his administratrix
the right to bring an action. The reasoning of the court was that actions
survive only when pending at the death of the injured person.
The conclusion could accordingly be drawn that if the plaintiff institutes his action before death his personal representative can continue
the action, but that if he dies before institution of the suit the result is
just the opposite, leaving only a cause of action under the Death Statute.
Any such interpretation, however, which results from failure to distinguish
between the parties and the cause of action, was overruled in the latest
case2 2 in this field. Decedent was injured in an automobile accident and
died before suit. The Florida Supreme Court held that the action could
be maintained by the personal representative, even though not instituted
before the death of the injured person and regardless of the cause of death.
Furthermore, the court laid down another and distinct proposition, namely,
that two rights are violated when physical injury ultimately resulting in
death is inflicted by tortious acts. 23 The one cause of action results from
"8Kahn v. Wolf, 151 Fla. 863, 10 So.2d 553 (1942).
0129 Fla. 50, 175 So. 786 (1937).
"Justice Brown concurred specially. He disagreed as to the construction of the
statute, stating that the legislature had met tweaty-five times since the court first
interpreted the survival statute, and that if any change in the construction of the
statute were made the legislature should do the job.
"I% 'e Moore's Estate, 153 Fla. 480, 15 So.2d 55 (1943).
"'Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1945).
"In other jurisdictions having both types of statutes there is a conflict as to
whether one is a bar to the other. The majority of courts hold that two causes of
action exist. Mageau v. Great Northern Ry., 103 Minn. 290, 115 N. W. 651 (1908);
Hamel v. Southern Ry., 108 Miss. 172, 66 Sq. 426 (1914), holding that the Death by
Wrongful Act statute is "a post mortem statute" and applies to actions which could
not have been brought by the deceased; Vicksburg & M. R. R. v. Phillips, 64 Miss.
693, 2 So. 537 (1887); Soden v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Co., 101 N. J. L.
393, 127 At. 558 (1925); Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.
E. 601 (1908); Belding v. Black Hills & Ft. P. R. R., 3 S. D. 669, 53 N. W. 750
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the common law right of the injured person to be secure in his person and
property; the other, from the right of the deceased's family to his
companionship, services, or support, together with their expectancy of
participation in the estate he might have accumulated had he lived. When
the injured person dies from causes other than the injury inflicted, the
only remedy is, of course, the action under the Survival Statute.

IV. DAmr S
Under the Survival Statute. In jurisdictions recognizing two distinct
causes of action it is most important in order to avoid duplication of
damages that a line be drawn between those recoverable under the
Death Statute and those recoverable under the Survival Statute. Outside Florida the damages allowed in a survival action are limited to those
that the deceased might have recovered had he lived; damages are not
permitted for losses extending beyond his death. 2 4 Now that Florida

(1892); Kochler v. Waukesba Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N. W. 901 (1926). Kentucky
holds that an election must be made between the two actions. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. v. Bauks, 142 Ky. 746, 135 S. W. 285 (1911), holding that the acts constituting
the wrong are inseparable. But in Rhode Island, in cases where death results from
the injury, the Death Act is exclusive on the theory that no new cause of action
arises. The Death Act gives a new right of recovery in substitution for the right of
action which the deceased would have had if he had survived. Slavin v. Hellenic
Baking Co., 50 R. I. 217, 146 At. 488 (1929); Lubrano v. Atlantic Mills, 19 R. I.
129, 32 AUt. 205 (1895). To add to the general confusion, in some jurisdictions the
Death Act is limited to cases of instantaneous death, while all other cases fall under
the Survival Statute. Renaldi v. New York Cent. Ry., 256 Mass. 337, 152 N. E. 373
(1926); Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. 42, 33 At!. 660 (1895). Contra: Walkup v. Coving.on, 18 Tenn. App. 117, 73 S. W.2d 718 (1934); Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43
Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931). Some courts hold that the survival action may be
brought only when death results from causes other than the injuries inflicted by the
tort-feasor. Bruce v. Collier, 221 Ala. 22, 127 So. 553 (1930); Sewell v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry, 78 Kan. 1, 96 Pac. 1007 (1907). The principal reason given in the
cases denying two causes of action is that a double recovery would result. This objection is logically invalid, as those jurisdictions which permit two causes of action
draw a line between damages whch may be recovered under the Death Statute and
those recoverable under the Survival Statute.
"Berryhill v. Nichols, 171 Miss. 769, 158 So. 470 (1935); Hamel v. Southern
Ry., 108 Miss. 172, 66 So. 809 (1915); Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio
St 395, 83 N. E. 601 (1908); St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142 Pac.
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recognizes the two causes of action, this rule is the logical one to follow.
Previous to the Waller case the court had not allowed any damages at all
under the Survival Statute, and since that time no cases have been reported indicating any confusion of the damages accruing under the Survival Statute with those arising under the Death by Wrongful Act Statute.
Since both causes of action are now permitted, damages in the proper
case should be recoverable under each statute to the extent permitted by
each of the two separate causes of action. Inasmuch as the personal representative maintains the same action under the Survival Statute that
the deceased could have brought, the damages should be confined to the
same elements that govern when the deceased lives and brings the action
himself. These elements include pain and suffering, 2 5 medical attendance, 2 6 loss of time and earnings, 2 7 mental anguish,28 and hospitalization. 29 The damages recoverable are limited to those purely compensatory.30
Under the Death by Wrongful Act Statute. Under the Death by
Wrongful Act Statute, the factors to be taken into consideration in determining damages have to a degree been settled by the Florida court.
These damages must be confined to pecuniary loss resulting to the statu-

1185 (1914); Smith v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 42 Okla. 577, 142 Pac. 398 (1914);
Mayher v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 181 Pa. 617, 37 AUt. 571 (1897); Nemecek v.
Filer & Stowell Co., 126 Wis. 71, 105 N. W. 225 (1905); Brown v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 102 Wis. 137, 77 NJ. W. 748 (1898).
"Toll v. Waters, 138 Fla. 349, 189 So. 393 (1939); Rosenberg v. Coman, 134 Fla.
768, 184 So. 238 (1938); Warner v. Ware, 136 Fla. 466, 182 So. 605 (1938); Roy v.
Oregon Short Line Ry., 55 Idaho 404, 42 P.2d 476 (1935); Iseman v. Hayes, 242 Ky.
302, 46 S. W.2d 110 (1932).
"'Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Arkansas v. Adcox, 189 Ark. 610, 74 S. W.2d 771
(1934); Smith v. Red Top Taxicab Corp., 111 N. J. L. 439, 168 Ad. 796 (1933).
"United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Littlejohn, 279 Fed. 223 (1922); Fabbro
v. Soderstrom, 252 Mich. 455, 233 N. W. 378 (1930); Perlman v. Shanck, 192 App.
Div. 179, 182 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1920).
"Southern Exp. Co. v. Platten, 93 Fed. 936 (1899); Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan.
508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916); McGowan v. Tayman, 144 Va. 358, 132 S. E. 316 (1926).
"Seeing Denver Co. v. Morgan, 66 Colo. 565, 185 Pac. 339 (1919); Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. v. Holliday, 73 Fla. 269, 74 So. 479 (1917); Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 336
Mo. 497, 79 S. W.2d 109 (1934).
"Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 2:. So.2d 213 (1945); Waller v. First Savings
and Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931).
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tory beneficiaries from the death of the deceased. 3 ' In a widow's action3 2
the jury may take into consideration her loss of comfort, of the protection and society of her husband, of his services in assisting her in the care
of the family, and of the support that her husband was legally bound
to give her. 33 She is also entitled to compensation for loss of whatever
she might reasonably have expected to receive in the way of dower or
legacies from her husband's estate, in case her life expectancy is greater
than his, a 4 but not for either her distress occasioned by his death or
35
for his mental or physical suffering from the injury.
Children bringing an action under this statute must be under the age
of twenty-one, 36 and may recover for the loss of support during minority,
as wel as for the loss of attention, care, comfort, companionship, pro37
tection, education, and moral training normally supplied by the father.
"W. B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 102 .Fla. 731, 136 So. 557 (1931),

which gives the test for pecuniary loss as ".. . what sum wil compensate the plaintiff
for the pecuniary loss sustained by him by the death of the deceased, or in other
words, what in view of all the facts and circumstances in evidence, was the probable
pecuniary interest of the plaintiff in the continuance of the life of the deceased"?
'IFLA. STAT. 1941, §768.02, lists the parties who may maintain an action under
this statute in the following order: (1) Widow or husband, as the case may be; (2)
minor child or children; (3) any person or persons dependent on such person killed
for support; (4) executor or administrator of the person killed.
sSouthern Utilities Co. v. Davis, 83 Fla. 366, 92 So. 683 (1922); Florida Cent.
& P. R. R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899).
:,Id.
'St. Johns Electric Co. v. Lawler, 90 Fla. 188, 105 So. 818 (1925); Southern
Utilities Co. v. Davis, 83 Fla. 366, 92 So. 683 (1922); Florida Cent. & P. R. R. v.
Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899) Fr.A. STAT. 1941, §768.03, provides for the
parents' recovery for the death of a minor, and it is to be noted that not only may
recovery be had for the loss of services but, in addition, recovery may be had for the
mental pain and suffering of the parents if they survive. The damages under this
statute are considered compensatory. Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161
So. 85 (1935). The loss of services sustained by a parent in the death of a minor
child is that which such parent would be entitled to receive between the death and
the majority of such minor. Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 600, 88 So. 601 (1921).
An adoptive parent may maintain an action under this statute. St. Petersburg v.
Jaeck, 79 Fla. 186, 53 So. 718 (1910). Mental pain and suffering of the parents
naturally result from the wrongful death of their minor child. Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. Moseley, 60 Fla. 186, 53 So. 718 (1910).
sFlorida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195, 182 So. 911 (1938),
which also holds that the minor may still maintain the action, even if married,
although
the damages in such case may be slight.
1 T
riay v. Seals, 92 Fla. 310, 109 So. 427 (1926).
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When the administrator brings the action, the amount of recovery is
not the value of the decedent's life, but rather the present value of the
estate that the decedent might reasonably have been expected to earn
and to save had he lived. 3 8 Punitive or exemplary damages are not
recoverable under the Death Statute. 39 A claim for funeral expenses
that shall be charged against the estate of a deceased wife is not recoverable by her husband in a Wrongful Death action, unless the husband
becomes obligated therefor before an administrator or executor is appointed. 40 Similarly, a widow sustains no liability for the funeral expenses of her husband, which should be recovered by his personal representative. 4 ' In all actions funeral expenses recoverable must be claimed
42
as special damages.
In determining the amount of damages under this statute, the deceased's age, health, business capacity, habits, experience, energy, present
and future prospects for business success at the time of death, probable
duration of life at such time, means, earnings, skill, and future expectations are the elements to be considered by the jury. 43 These damages are
confined to the loss suffered by the statutory beneficiaries and do not
embrace damages accruing to the deceased or his personal representative
44
in a Survival Statute action.
V.

DEFENSES

Under the Survival Statute. Since the Survival Statute provides the
precise action that the deceased could have maintained had he lived,
the defenses thereto should also logically be available against his personal
representative. These include contributory negligence, 4 5 imputed negli"Florida East Coast Ry. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914).
"9Florida East Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
"Potts v. Mulligan, 141 Fla. 685, 193 So. 767 (1940).

"Ibid.
"Coral Gables v. Neill, 133 Fla. 4, 182 So. 432 (1938); International Shoe Co. v.
Hewitt, 123 Fla. 587, 167 So. 7 (1936).
"Marianna & B. R. R. v. May, 83 Fla. 524, 91 So. 553 (1922); Florida Cent. &
P. R. R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899). The habits of the deceased's
friends would not be admissible in determining life expectancy. International Shoe Co.
v. Hewitt, 123 Fla. 587, 167 So. 7 (1936).
"Potts v. Mulligan, 141 Fla. 685, 193 So. 767 (1940); Florida East Coast Ry. v.
McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
"Motor Transit Co. v. Hutchinson, 154 Fla. 798, 19 So.2d 57 (1944); Cornell v.
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gence, 46 and release. 4 7
The Statute of Limitations normally begins to run from the date of
the injury. 4 s Actions purely in tort must be brought within four years4 9
unless based on a tort, such as malpractice, 50 growing out of contract, in
which event the period is three years. 51 In actions of libel, slander, assault
and battery, or false imprisonment, a period of two years only is
52
permitted.
Under the Death by Wrongful Act Statute. Under this statute the
same defenses that could have been used against the deceased or his
representative in a Survival Statute action are available against the
plaintiff, 53 the only possible exception occurring when the injured person or his representative has allowed the Statute of Limitations to run
against the action for personal injuries. 5 4 As the causes of action, however, are distinct, most courts will not permit a bar as a result of the
55
Statute of Limitations to become, ipso facto, a bar to the death action.
First Natl. Bank of Miami, 121 Fla. 192, 163 So. 482 (1935); Jacksonville Beach v.
Jones, 101 Fla. 95, 131 So. 369 (1930); Carter v. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 83
Fla. 470, 91 So. 893 (1922); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Yarborough, 61 Fla. 307, 54
So. 462 (1911).
"Potter v. Florida Motor Lines, Inc., Caraker v. Same, 57 F.2d 313 (1932).
"Florida East Coast Ry. v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30, 111 So. 525 (1927).
'8 Wllllams v. Alabama Great So. R. R., 158 Ala. 396, 48 So. 485 (1909); Douglas
v. Orth, 44 Cal. App. 95, 185 Pac. 1005 (1919); Brown v. Emerson Brick Co., 15 Ga.
App. 332, 83 S. E. 160 (1914); Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N. W. 217 (1917);
Decosta v. Ye Craftsman Studio, 278 Mass. 315, 180 N. E. 151 (1932).
"'FLA. STAT. 1941, §95.11(4); Warner v. Ware, 136 Fla. 466, 182 So. 605 (1938).
"Palmer v. Jackson, 62 Fla. 249, S7 So. 240 (1911). But in another jurisdiction
it was held that under the common law an action for malpractice of a physician
is essentially an action based upon a personal tort and abates with the death of the
physician. Speer v. Brown, 28 Cal. App.2d, 79 Pa2d 179 (1938).
8
FzA. STAT. 1941, §95.11(5).
5FLA. STAT. 1941, §95.11(6). As actions of slander, assault and battery, and false
imprisonment immediately abate on the death of the plaintiff, actually the two-year
statute is applicable only in libel, when the plaint:ff brings an action under the
survival statute.
"O'Brien v. Standard Oi Co. of Ky., 38 F.2d 808 (1930); Cline v. Powell, 141
Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1940).
"Williams v. Alabama Great So. R. R., 158 Ala. 396, 48 So. 485 (1908); Sachs
v. Sioux City, 109 Iowa 224, 80 N. W. 336 (1899); Howard v. Bell Tel. Co., 306
Pa. 518, 160 At. 613 (1932).
"Homiewicz v. Orlowski, 4 Harr. 66, 143 Ati. 250 (1928); German American
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The defendant may bar the action by establishing the existence of a
person in being with a right of action superior to that of plaintiff. 56
As regards the Statute of Limitations, 57 the court originally took the
position in Collins v. Hall5s that time begins to run from the commission of
the act causing the wrongful death. In a recent case, 59 however, this view
was discarded, and the law today is that the material date is that of the
death itself.
VI.

SUMMARY

From this discussion the following principles may be drawn:
A. No action for personal injuries under the Survival Statute or
for death under the Wrongful Death Statute dies with the tortfeasor.
B. The only personal actions that die with the injured person
are the actions of assault and battery, slander, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution.
C. The foregoing two rules apply even though both the injured
party and the tort-feasor die before action is instituted.
D. If the injured person dies as a result of the injuries inflicted
by the tort-feasor, two distinct causes of actions arise: the personal
representative of the injured person may bring an action for the personal injuries (if the injured person has not already recovered damages for this action); and the statutory beneficiaries may bring an
action for their pecuniary loss resulting from the wrongful death.
E. Damages recoverable under the Survival Statute are those
that the injured person could have recovered had he lived; damages
recoverable under the Death By Wrongful Act Statute are those
accruing to the statutory beneficiaries as a result of the death. Such
Trust Co. v. Lafayette Box, Board & Paper Co., 52 Ind. App. 211, 98 N. E. 874
(1912); Senecal v. West St. Paul, 111 Minn. 253, 126 N. W. 826 (1910); Causey
v Seaboard Air Line Ry., 165 N. C. 5, 81 S. E. 917 (1914).

As Florida also rec-

ognizes two distinct causes of action, the logical rule would be to follow these holdings, though the question has not yet been the subject of reported litigation.
"0 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Jones, 45 Fla. 407, 34 So. 246 (1903).
"'FLA. STAT. 1941, §95.11(6), "WITHIN TWO YEARS. .

. .

An action arising

upon account of an act causing wrongful death." An action brought by a parent
for the wrongful death of a minor is barred within two years. FLA. STAT. 1941, §768.04.
:'117 Fla. 282, 157 So. 646 (1934).
'St. Francis Hospital, Inc., v. Thompson, 31 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1947).
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